33 Comments in moderation

West African Court of Appeal & Privy Council

REX

V.

GIDE OF ASATUWA

WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA

10TH DAY OF JUNE, 1935

2PLR/1935/41 (WACA)

OTHER CITATION(S)

2PLR/1935/41 (WACA)

(1935) II WACA PP. 334 – 335

LEX (1935) – II WACA PP. 334 – 335

BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:

KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA  

WEBBER, C.J., SIERRA LEONE

BUTLER-LLOYD, J.

BETWEEN:

REX — RESPONDENT

AND

GIDE OF ASATUWA — APPELLANT

REPRESENTATION  

O. O. Alakija — for Appellant

A. R. W. Sayle — for Crown

ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE — PROOF OF CRIME:-  Murder — Inadmissible Evidence of Accused’s bad character — Duty of trial Judge to discard same — Distinction between Judge and Jury when inadmissible evidence is unexpectedly given — Proper treatment of

DECISION OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL

Held (dismissing the appeal):

1.     Where it is impossible to prevent the accused’s previous character becoming known to the Court, it is the duty of the trial Judge to instruct himself to disregard such character in weighing the evidence against the accused whilst allowing it full weight in so far as it tells in accused’s favour upon the probabilities.

2.     A Judge is not in quite the same position as a jury. He is trained to disregard inadmissible evidence which may be brought out by chance. So, if appellate Courts were to quash convictions where previous character of accused were made known, it would make the difficulties of conducting trials almost insuperable.

3.     There has been no miscarriage of justice in this case, the evidence of the prosecution pointing overwhelmingly to the guilt of the accused.

MAIN JUDGMENT

The following joint judgment was delivered:

KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA, WEBBER, C.J., SIERRA LEONE, AND BUTLER-LLOYD, J.

In this case the only possible ground upon which this Court could be asked to quash the conviction of the appellant for murder is the fact that the first witness for the prosecution when giving evidence in chief was asked “What is accused’s occupation?” and replied “Stealing.” That was at once evidence of accused’s bad character and therefore inadmissible. The trial Judge promptly and properly formally disallowed the question and answer.

Directly the accused started to cross-examine it became evident that it was an essential part of his defence that he was a bad character i.e. his defence was that the crime was put upon him by the prosecution witnesses on account of his known bad character.

In the trial of illiterate and primitive men where the witnesses are of the same class it is frequently impossible to prevent the accused’s previous character becoming known to the Court. Frequently, as in this case, the accused himself is anxious to bring it to notice.

When this happens it is the duty of the trial Judge to instruct himself to disregard such character in weighing the evidence against the accused whilst allowing it full weight in so far as it tells in accused’s favour upon the probabilities.

A Judge is not in quite the same position as a jury. He is trained to disregard inadmissible evidence which may be brought out by chance. In this case the Judge’s summing up and instruction to himself is exactly what it ought to be, and if this Court were to quash this conviction it would make the difficulties of conducting trials of this nature almost insuperable. There has obviously been no miscarriage of justice in this case, the evidence of the prosecution pointing overwhelmingly to the guilt of the accused.

 The appeal is dismissed.