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CHIEF KOFI AKRASI
V.
CHIEF OSEI KOJO
THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL, HOLDEN AT ACCRA, GOLD COAST
21ST DAY OF JUNE, 1951
2PLR/1951/25 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1951/25 (WACA)
(1951) XIII WACA PP. 243-245
LEX (1951) – XIII WACA 243 – 245
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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
VERITY, AG. P.
LEWEY, J.A.
MORGAN, J.
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BETWEEN:
CHIEF KOFI AKRASI FOR HIMSELF AND AS REPRBSBNTING THE STOOL AND PEOPLE OF NYABOE – Defendant-Appellant
AND
CHIEF OSEI KOJO FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE PATRIENSA STOOL – Plaintiff-Respondent
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ORIGINATING COURT(S)
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Civil Appeal 68/49
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REPRESENTATION
Siriboe — for the Respondent
Hayfron-Benjamin — for the Appellant
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
REAL ESTATE AND PROPERTY LAW – LAND:- Jurisdiction of the Land Court or Divisional Court – What is an issue relating to ownership, possession or occupation of land triable by the Land Court – Section 20A of the Courts Ordinance (Cap. 4) conferring, in certain circumstances, exclusive original jurisdiction on Land Court considered
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ISSUE(S)
JURISDICTION:- Effect of counter-claim on jurisdiction of Court where claim originally within jurisdiction of Court and counter-claim outside its jurisdiction – Relevant considerations
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CASE SUMMARY
The defendant was the appellant. The plaintiff claimed in the Ashanti Divisional Court the sum of £509 as cocoa tribute. He also claimed an order for forfeiture of the defendant’s farm. At the trial the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court was challenged on the grounds that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to try claims relating to the possession or occupation of land. The trial Judge held that a claim for possession or occupation of land was intended to apply where such claims amounted to a dispute which put the title to the land in issue. As the title was not in issue he held the Divisional Court had jurisdiction and proceeded to hear the case.
The defendant filed a counter-claim claiming damages for trespass.
On the appeal Counsel for the defendant argued that the Divisional Court had not jurisdiction; that jurisdiction resided either in a Native Court or the Land Court and submitted that the Divisional Court erred in holding that the words “ownership, possession or occupation” should not be limited to circumstances where the claim involved a decision as to the ownership of the land. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that where a claim is made which is not within the jurisdiction of the Court, and a counter-claim is entered which is within its jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Court is restored.
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DECISION(S) OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held (allowing the Appeal) that:
1. The meaning of the words “ownership, possession or occupation” is not limited to claims involving a decision as to the ownership of the land. The claim was that the defendants should be dispossessed after failure to pay tribute, thereby entitling the landlord to re-enter on forfeiture.
2. This was clearly a case relating to the possession or occupation of land, consequently the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case. For the purpose of this case it was necessary to decide whether the limits imposed on the jurisdiction of the Land Court ousted its jurisdiction and made the case triable by a Native Court.
3. The effect of a counter-claim is that where the Court had jurisdiction to hear the claim, the fact that a counter-claim is entered which is outside the jurisdiction of the Court has no effect on the original jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine the issue in the case.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following Judgment was delivered:
VERITY, AG. P.
In this case the plaintiff claimed in the Ahanti Divisional Court against the defendant for a sum of £509 odd as “cocoa tribute” due by the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of certain cocoa farms. He also claimed an order for forfeiture to the plaintiff of the defendant’s cocoa farm or in the alternative, by an amendment to the claim, in lieu of forfeiture the payment of a further sum of money.
When the matter came on for hearing in the Divisional Court it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that the Court had no jurisdiction inasmuch as the suit related to the possession or occupation of land. The learned Judge reserved the point and then gave a ruling. The effect of the ruling was that there was nothing in the documents which created relationship between the parties in regard to these cocoa farms which suggested that title to the land on which the farms are situated is in dispute. And the learned Judge went on that the documents proved that the forfeiture contemplated was not such a claim to occupation or possession as was contemplated by the Native Courts Ordinance and proceeded that it was obviously intended to apply to claims relating to such occupation or possession of land as would amount to a dispute which puts the title to the land in issue. He therefore held that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction and proceeded to hear it.
When the matter came before this Court by way of an appeal it was submitted on behalf of the defendant that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction, that jurisdiction in this dispute resided either in a Native Court or in a Land Court.
In the first place it is to be considered what is the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in regard to land and how it is effected by section 20A of the Courts Ordinance (Cap. 4). By that section certain Lands Divisions of the Supreme Court were constituted and it was provided by subsection 4 of section 20A that the Land Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land in certain circumstances.
I would not for the moment deal with the circumstances in which the Land Court exercises jurisdiction. It is sufficient, I think, for the purpose of this appeal to refer to the fact that by this section of the Courts Ordinance the Land Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine any cause or matter relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land. When, therefore, it is sought to bring a cause or matter in the Supreme Court and the question arises as to whether it is a Divisional or Land Court which is to exercise that jurisdiction it is only necessary to determine whether or not it is a cause or matter relating to the ownership, possession or occupation of land. If it does so relate, then the Land Court has exclusive original jurisdiction and a Divisional Court has therefore no jurisdiction. Coming to the present case, that is, I think, the only point which we have to determine: if the issue relates to the ownership, possession or occupation of land.
Although the learned Judge in the Court below appears to have directed his attention rather to the question as to whether it was the Native Court or Supreme Court which possessed jurisdiction at the same time he did seek to interpret what is meant by the words, “ownership, possession or- occupation,” and he appears to have limited the meaning of the words “possession or occupation” to such circumstances only where the claim to possession or occupation involves a decision as to the ownership of the land. In so restricting the meaning and application of the words I think the learned Judge erred. What is to be considered is whether the cause or matter relates to the ownership of land or to the possession of land or to the occupation of land, and if it relates to one or another of those three things, then the Land Court has exclusive original jurisdiction and the Divisional Court has no jurisdiction to hear or determine the matter.
As far as the first claim by the plaintiff in this suit is concerned I think it is beyond doubt and it has not been argued to the contrary that it is not a matter which relates to the ownership, possession or occupation of land. It is a claim for rents pure and simple.
In regard to the second claim, that of forfeiture, I find myself quite unable to determine that that does not relate to the possession or occupation of land. Whatever may be the nature of the transaction between the parties and whether it is one to which is to be applied native customary law or some other law, it appears to be that the claim by the plaintiff clearly relates to the possession or occupation of land.
The claim is that the defendants who, under this agreement were to have possession of these cocoa farms upon the payment of certain tribute should be dispossessed and the issue is whether failure to pay the tribute had entitled the landlord to re-enter on forfeiture. Clearly the defence in this case was that whether or not the defendant has failed to pay tribute, the landlord was not entitled to re-enter, as they were not under any forfeiture and remained entitled to possession. That this was the nature of the defence is, in my view, made more clear by the fact that the defendant entered a counter-claim which is clearly a claim for damages for trespass – a claim which is based only on the right to possession.
Counsel for the plaintiff before us referred to a proviso relating to the jurisdiction in such matters, and referring to counter-claims, and if I understood his argument aright it was to the effect that where a counter-claim is entered in a case which would otherwise be outside the jurisdiction of the Court the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is restored. I do not think that is the real meaning of that proviso. I think its meaning is that where the case is originally within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court the mere fact that a counter-claim is entered which deals with matters outside that jurisdiction has no effect on the original jurisdiction of the Court to hear and determine the issue in the case. But in my event, I would not base my view of the nature of this issue on the counter-claim as such but as an indication of the real issue between the parties in this matter. Was it the right of the defendant to continue in possession or the right of the landlord to forfeit the agreement and re-enter? That being so, my view is that the matter is clearly one “relating to the possession or occupation of land”.
If the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is to be exercised in relation to this dispute, then it is the Land Court which has the approved jurisdiction and not the Divisional Court. Therefore, I think that this ground of appeal succeeds and the appeal should be allowed.
I only wish to add one thing, and that is that I would not wish parties to consider that anything I have said indicates that in this particular case it is the Land Court that has the jurisdiction. It may be that the circumstances do not bring the matter within the limits imposed upon jurisdiction of the Land Court by subsection 4 of section 20A of the Courts Ordinance, and it may be, therefore, that if a Native Court exists in that area, it is a case within the jurisdiction of that Native Court. But in regard to the only question that I think this Court is called upon to decide I am of the opinion that the Divisional Court had no jurisdiction.
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LEWEY, J. A.
I concur.
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MORGAN, J.
I concur.
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Appeal allowed.
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