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JOHNSON AKPIRI
V.
THE WEST AFRICAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION
THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL, HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA
17TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1952
2PLR/1952/35 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1952/35 (WACA)
(1952) XIV WACA PP. 195-196
LEX (1952) – XIV WACA 195-196
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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
FOSTER-SUTTON, P.
VERITY, C.J., NIGERIA,
COUSSEY, J.A.
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BETWEEN:
JOHNSON AKPIRI – Appellant
AND
THE WEST AFRICAN AIRWAYS CORPORATION – Respondents
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REPRESENTATION
M. A. Odesanya — for Appellant
A. M. Ferguson — for Respondents
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
REAL ESTATE AND PROPERTY LAW:- Landlord and Tenant – Person operating a canteen – “Tenant” under section 2 (1) of Recovery of Premises Ordinance (Cap. 193)
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CASE SUMMARY
Appeal by plaintiff: No. 3632.
The Corporation agreed with the appellant that he should operate a canteen for their staff, and he was allowed to use free of rent the Corporation’s premises. Later the Corporation wrote to him to vacate them and hand the keys to their representative; but he did not. They re-took possession; and he sued for unlawful ejectment. The Corporation pleaded he was a mere licensee; and the trial Judge held that the plaintiff had not shown any demise of an interest in land, and gave judgment for the Corporation. The plaintiff appealed, and the question turned on whether he was a “tenant” within the said section 2(1) as, if he was, the Corporation should have taken the steps provided in the Ordinance. That sub-section defines a tenant to include “any person occupying premises whether on payment of rent or otherwise but does not include a person occupying premises under a bona fide claim to be the owner of the premises”.
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DECISION(S) OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held (allowing the Appeal):
1. The word “occupying” must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning;
2. The appellant was occupying the premises as was clear from the respondent’s letter to him to vacate them and hand the keys; he was a tenant within the meaning of the Ordinance.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following judgment was delivered:
FOSTER-SUTTON, P.
In this case the appellant, who was the plaintiff in the Court below, sued the respondents for damages, claiming that they had unlawfully ejected him from premises at Ikeja Airport and that he had suffered damage thereby.
It was admitted that the appellant had agreed with the respondents to operate a canteen at the Airport for the benefit of their African staff and that for such purpose the appellant was permitted the use, without payment of rent, of premises belonging to the respondents.
The respondents’ case was that the appellant proved unsatisfactory and that on the 7th September, 1950, they addressed a letter to him, Exhibit “A”, requiring him to vacate the premises by 14th September, and that he having failed to comply with the notice they re-took possession of the premises on 19th September. They maintained that the appellant was not a tenant at will of the premises, as alleged by him, but merely a licensee thereof.
The learned trial Judge held that the facts of the case did not “show any demise of an interest in land” and that the appellant was, as claimed by the respondents, a mere licensee of the premises, and he entered judgment for the respondents on the footing that the appellant not being a tenant and having failed to comply with the notice to quit the premises the respondents were acting lawfully when they ejected him.
As counsel for the appellant rightly argued, the sole point which arises for determination on this appeal is the question whether the appellant was a tenant as defined in section 2 ( 1) of the Recovery of Premises Ordinance (Cap. 193). If he was, the respondents should have taken the steps provided for in that Ordinance and their action in summarily ejecting the appellant was unlawful
The definition of tenant in section 2 (1) of the Ordinance reads as follows:-
“‘tenant’ includes any person occupying premises whether on payment of rent or otherwise but does not include a person occupying premises under a bona fide claim to be the owner of the premises “.
Respondents’ Counsel submitted that the appellant as a licensee had no right of exclusive occupation, that he merely had the use of the premises, and that he was not, therefore, a tenant within the meaning of the Ordinance.
The word “occupation” in the definition, to which I have already referred, must be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, and, in my opinion, it is beyond argument that the appellant was in occupation of the premises in question. The respondents themselves appear to have recognised this fact because the letter they addressed to the appellant, Exhibit “A”, instructed him to vacate the premises within one week and hand the keys to their representative.
It follows that, in my view, the learned trial Judge erred in holding that the appellant was not a tenant within the meaning of the Ordinance. I would, therefore, allow this appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the Court below and enter judgment for the appellant for £100, being the amount the learned trial Judge indicated he would have awarded the appellant had judgment gone in his favour, with £34 16s. 6d. costs.
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VERITY, C. J.
I concur.
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COUSSEY, J.A.
I concur.
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Appeal allowed.
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