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ALEXANDER ALEXANDER LOGIOS
V.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF NIGERIA
WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA
11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1938.
2PLR/1938/10 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1938/10 (WACA)
(1938) IV WACA PP. 162 – 164
LEX (1938) – IV WACA PP. 162-164
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST
WEBB, C.J., SIERRA LEONE
BUTLER-LLOYD, J.
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BETWEEN:
ALEXANDER ALEXANDER LOGIOS — Plaintiff-Appellant
AND
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF NIGERIA — Defendant-Respondent
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ORIGINATING COURT(S)
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT OF HIGH COURT
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REPRESENTATION:
R. F. Irving with A. L. Johnson — for the Appellant
The Acting Solicitor-General — for the Respondent
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
REAL ESTATE AND PROPERTY LAW — LAND:- Claim for Certificate of Occupancy — Principal and Agent
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CASE SUMMARY
The plaintiff applied to the Government of Nigeria for a Certificate of Occupancy of a plot of land at Kano. He was resident abroad and there after acted through his solicitor. The certificate was granted to another person on the representation of the solicitor. The plaintiff alleged that the agency between himself and the solicitor had been terminated. The Government was not informed of such termination.
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DECISION OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held:
1. A certain amount of confusion has been caused by the fact that the respondent relied on an assignment, or purported assignment, of the appellant’s right by a firm of Whitehead & Sons purporting to have been made by them as equitable mortgagees under a memorandum of equitable mortgage signed by the appellant on 7th August, 1935. It appears however that this memorandum was by the law in force in Nigeria invalid to transfer any interest, legal or equitable, in the premises to Whitehead & Sons, and therefore they were incompetent to deal with them.
2. It is well settled that an agent may be appointed or his authority conferred by word of mouth save only where he is appointed to execute an instrument under seal on behalf of his principal. There is evidence that the solicitor was well authorised to have the Certificate of Occupancy issued to Gaisers as purchasers of the appellant’s interest in the premises, and it justified a finding that the respondent was entitled to act on the assumption that the solicitor had such authority.
3. The respondent was entitled to assume that the solicitor was still the agent of the appellant, and appeal dismissed.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following judgment, with which the other members of the Court were in agreement, was delivered:
WEBB, C.J., SIERRA LEONE.
This seems to me to be a very clear case. The appellant’s claim is in effect that he is entitled to the grant of a Certificate of Occupancy of a plot of land at Kano in virtue of an undertaking contained in a letter from the Resident Kano, dated 7th November, 1935. In fact a Certificate of Occupancy was granted on 16th May, 1936, to a firm called Gaisers.
A certain amount of confusion has been caused by the fact that the respondent relied on an assignment, or purported assignment, of the appellant’s right by a firm of Whitehead & Sons purporting to have been made by them as equitable mortgagees under a memorandum of equitable mortgage signed by the appellant on 7th August, 1935. It appears however that this memorandum was by the law in force in Nigeria invalid to transfer any interest, legal or equitable, in the premises to Whitehead & Sons, and therefore they were incompetent to deal with them. This aspect of the case may be ignored.
The other, and, in my judgment the real defence was that the Certificate of Occupancy was issued to Gaisers at the request of the appellant conveyed through his solicitor and agent in the matter, Mr. Oddie, in completion of the sale of the appellant’s interest to them. The appellant denied that Mr. Oddie had, or was Alexander held out by him to have, authority in this behalf. The learned Alexander Chief Justice held that the Government dealt with Mr. Oddie in good faith on the assumption that he had such authority, and his judgment obviously implies that he held further that such assumption was a reasonable one. It appears from the evidence that, although the letter containing the undertaking to issue a Certificate of Occupancy to the appellant was only written in November, it had really been agreed as early as June that this should be done (Exhibit D).
In the meantime the appellant had gone to Europe and there had entered into negotiations with one Brettschneider for the sale to him, or his firm Gaisers, of his interest, whatever its exact nature was, for a sum to be paid to Whitehead & Sons in reduction of the appellant’s indebtedness to them. And, as appears by the uncontradicted evidence of Mr. Brettschneider, the figure was agreed early in October at £1,400, which was duly paid to Whitehead & Sons.
On 22nd October, Mr. Oddie, who says that it had been arranged between him and the appellant that he should endeavour to sell the premises, wrote to the appellant (Exhibit AG) informing him of this and enclosing a draft assignment for execution by him. It is true that on 12th November (Exhibit AG), a firm of English solicitors acting for the appellant cabled to Mr. Oddie Logios refuses sell premises Kano,” but the latter at once replied (Exhibit AK) that “following Mr. Logios interview with Messrs. Gaisers the sale was arranged and has been completed.”
In his evidence Mr. Oddie explained that by this he meant, as must indeed have been obvious, that the contract for sale had been completed. Yet after this the appellant, or his advisers, never wrote one word of protest or repudiation to Mr. Brettschneider, nor was any step taken to inform the Government that Mr. Oddie had exceeded his authority, or that his agency had been revoked, and warning them not to issue a Certificate of Occupancy to anyone other than the appellant himself. On the contrary we find that on 16th April, 1936, and again on 18th July, 1936 (Exhibits AI, and AN), the appellant wrote to Mr. Brettschneider letters one of which refers to the settlement of his differences with Whitehead & Sons, and the other to his hope of obtaining employment from Mr. Brettschneider’s firm, but neither of which contains a word suggesting that he repudiates the purchase of his interest in the premises at Kano.
Mr. Irving has argued that the letter of 7th November, conferred upon the appellant a vested interest such that Mr. Oddie could only deal with it as his agent if authorised in that behalf in writing. There is no foundation for such a proposition, it being well settled that an agent may be appointed or his authority conferred by word of mouth save only where he is appointed to execute an instrument under seal on behalf of his principal — see Bowstead on Agency 8 Ed. p. 41.
In my judgment this evidence would have justified a finding that the appellant had authorised Mr. Oddie to have the Certificate of Occupancy issued to Gaisers as purchasers of the appellant’s interest in the premises, and it justified a finding that the respondent was entitled to act on the assumption that Mr. Oddie had such authority. I am therefore of opinion that the appeal should be dismissed.