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MADU FATUMANI
V.
THE KING
THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL, HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA
14TH DAY OF APRIL, 1950
2PLR/1950/25 (WACA)
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OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1950/25 (WACA)
(1950) XIII WACA PP. 39 – 40
LEX (1950) – XIII WACA 39 – 40
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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
BLACKALL, P.
LEWEY, J.A.
ADIDIOLA, J.
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BETWEEN
MADU FATUMANI – Appellant
AND
THE KING – Respondent
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ORIGINATING COURT(S)
Appeal from the Supreme Court, W.A.C.A. CR. APP. 3201/50
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REPRESENTATION
G. B. A. Coker — for Appellant
Amachree — for Respondent
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Statement by suspected person to a Village Head in answer to a remark by Head-Village – Head in same position as Police Office and to be regarded as a person in authority investigating a crime – Right to question a suspected person when no decision to charge has been made – Distinction between threat or promise and a moral adjuration
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CASE SUMMARY
The appellant was convicted of murder. A hue and cry was raised and the appellant was apprehended running away from the scene of the crime and brought before the Village Head, who said to him that he should not trouble his fellows and if he had done it he should say so.
Counsel for the appellant submitted that any statements following that observation were inadmissible as no caution had been given.
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DECISION(S) OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held (dismissing the Appeal) that:
1. The remark of the Village Head was merely a moral adjuration not amounting to a threat or promise. A Village Head was a person in authority and in the same position as a Police Officer investigating a crime.
2. The person questioned by his Head was only a suspected person concerning whom no decision to charge him with the crime had been made. In endeavouring to discover the author of a crime, the person suspected can be questioned, and the remark of the Village Head did not render inadmissible the appellant’s reply.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following judgment was delivered:
BLACKALL, P.
The appellant was convicted of the murder of a man named Muhammadu. The evidence disclosed that while the deceased was asleep, a thief attempted to steal his gown. His brother Kentu, who was nearby, awoke and saw the thief wrestling with the deceased, and then running away. Kentu noticed that he was wearing blue trousers and a blue shirt; he ran after him and raised a hue and cry; a large number of people joined in the chase, and the evidence is that they kept the man in sight until they caught him. The man they caught was the appellant. Having tied him up they brought him to where the body was. The Village Head then arrived on the scene and asked who had killed the deceased. The people said the appellant had. The appellant denied this, and the Village Head then said to him that he should not trouble his fellows, if he had done it he should say so.
It was submitted for the appellant that any statements made following that observation were inadmissible, as no caution had been given.
The law on this point is contained in section 28, at seq. of the Evidence Ordinance is to the effect that a confession is inadmissible if it is induced by a threat a promise in relation to the charge, made by a person in authority. But in the present case the remark of the Village Head was, in the opinion of this Court, merely a moral adjuration. Moreover, the Judges’ Rules allow that when a Police Officer is endeavouring to discover the author of a crime, there is no objection to his putting questions to any person, whether suspected or not, whom he thinks useful information can be obtained; it is only when he made up his mind to charge the person that a caution must be administered.
That proposition was laid down in the Judges’ Rules with reference to Police Officers, but we conceive the same principle applies to questions put by any other person in authority investigating a crime. In the present case it is quite clear that when the Village Head spoke the words in question, he had not made up his mind as to the prisoner’s guilt, nor had the prisoner been charged. This ground of appeal, therefore, fails.
It was further argued that there was no evidence of identification. The answer to this is that Kentu, who was an eye-witness, kept his eye on the appellant until after the other persons had joined in the chase, and those persons did not lose sight of him; there was, therefore, abundant evidence of identification.
The other points raised do not call for any observations. The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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