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FUGAH AND AKOGLO AND ANOTHER
V.
TAMAKLOE, CHIEF ATTIPOE
WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL HOLDEN AT ACCRA, GOLD COAST (GHANA)
3RD DAY OF APRIL, 1939
2PLR/1939/12 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1939/12 (WACA)
(1939) V WACA PP. 90 – 91
LEX (1939) – V WACA PP. 90 – 91
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST (GHANA)
WEBB, C.J., SIERRA LEONE
AND BUTLER LLOYD, AG. C.J.
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BETWEEN:
FUGAH AND AKOGLO
AWUMEE GBEDEMAH — Plaintiffs-Appellants
AND
TAMAKLOE, CHIEF ATTIPOE — Defendant-Respondent
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
NA
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ISSUE(S)
APPEAL:- Where appellants ordered to execute a Bond binding against their tribe – Failure thereto by executing same in their personal capacity – Legal effect
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DECISION OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held:
1. Bond was executed in personal capacity and not binding on tribe.
2. Permission to amend and re-execute the Bond refused as Respondent had had no opportunity to consider the effect or validity of alleged authority given to appellants by tribe.
Final leave to appeal refused.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following joint judgment was delivered:
PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST, WEBB, C.J., SIERRA LEONE, AND BUTLER LLOYD, AG. C.J., NIGERIA.
Application for final leave to appeal is refused. On 29th November, 1938, the named appellants were given up to 28th February to execute a Bond that would be binding as against the Klevie Tribe, the sufficiency of the Bond to be determined by a Judge of this Court.
On 27th February they executed a Bond. The matter came before Barton J. on the 15th March when he, being of opinion that bond had been executed by appellants in their personal capacity, adjourned the matter for consideration of this Court. In our opinion the new bond is executed by Fugah and Akoglo in their personal capacity. They do not purport to sign as representatives of the tribe. Their Counsel suggests that the Court should now allow them to amend and re-execute the Bond saying that they have at all events written authority to institute these proceedings.
In our opinion it would be unreasonable to adopt this course because the Respondent had no opportunity of considering the effect or validity of the alleged authority. The appellants were represented by Counsel last November and if they failed to take his advice in the preparation of the new Bond they have only themselves to blame.
In our opinion the Bond dated 27th February, 1939, is insufficient to comply with the previous order of this Court and we accordingly refuse final leave to appeal.
We grant the respondent £7 7s. costs.
As we have refused final leave the other motion is dismissed, Mr. Dove stating he knows nothing about it.
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