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LARYEA GOE
V.
THE QUEEN
THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL, HOLDEN AT ACCRA, GOLD COAST
12TH DAY OF MARCH, 1953
W.A.C.A. NO. 82/52
2PLR/1953/46 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1953/46 (WACA)
(1953) XIV WACA PP. 277-278
LEX (1953) – XIV WACA 277-278
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
FOSTER-SUTTON, P.
COUSSEY, J.A.
WINDSOR-AUBREY, J.
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BETWEEN:
LARYEAGOE – Appellant
AND
THE QUEEN – Respondent
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ORIGINATING COURT(S)
Appeal by a convicted person against decision of Supreme Court
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REPRESENTATION
A. G. Heward-Mills for Appellant
A. M. Akiwumi, Crown Counsel, for Respondent
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – STEALING:- Evidence of an accomplice – Circumstantial corroboration – When would be deemed admissible
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CASE SUMMARY
The appellant was accused of stealing tyres and the evidence against him was that he had sold some to two purchasers, one of whom the trial Judge regarded as an accomplice. The argument was inter alia that the evidence offered as corroboration was evidence of approaches by the appellant to other persons who, he thought, would assist him in stopping a criminal prosecution and that that evidence was not corroboration of the actual sales (which is the point on which the case is reported).
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DECISION(S) OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held (dismissing the Appeal) that:
Corroboration may be circumstantial: the evidence was offered to prove that the appellant had dealings with or had made admissions in respect of the tyres against himself, which connected him with the theft of the tyres and was therefore corroboration of the accomplice.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following Judgment was delivered:
COUSSEY, J. A.
In this matter the appellant was charged with the theft of sixteen “Good Year” tyres of the value of £416, the property of the United Africa Co., from the Accra Harbour Dump on the 14th May, 1952.
The Crown offered no direct evidence of the theft of the tyres from the warehouse by the appellant, but evidence of dealings by the appellant with six of the tyres identified to have been stolen was given. On that evidence, the learned Judge, after a full trial, found that there was evidence which proved that the first accused sold four of the tyres to one Quayekuma Boye and two of the tyres to a Mr. Sowah Laryea. That evidence, believed as it was, was evidence of recent possession and recent dealing with the stolen goods.
On the matter coming before us, Mr. Heward-Mills on behalf of the appellant has, in a well-formulated argument, pointed out certain discrepancies in the evidence of some of the Crown witnesses. He referred also to a mis-statement in the judgment of the learned trial Judge in that he said that the purchase by Quayekuma Boye of four of the tyres for the sum of £120, that is to say, the actual payment, was corroborated by two men who accompanied Quayekuma Boye to pay the money when in fact on the evidence one man only accompanied the witness.
Reading from the concluding passage of the judgment convicting the appellant, Mr Heward-Mills has argued that the other corroboration referred to was corroboration not of the purchase of the two parcels of tyres, but evidence of approaches or attempted approaches made by the appellant to other persons who, he thought, would assist him in stopping a criminal prosecution. It is argued that that evidence was not corroboration of the actual sales of the two sets of tyres; that is true, but it is clear that that evidence was offered to prove that the appellant had dealings with or had made admissions in respect of the tyres against himself to other persons, and it is evidence corroborating the witness Quayekuma Boye who, the learned trial Judge considered, might be treated as an accomplice in the matter, namely, the connection of the appellant with the theft of the tyres. On this point, the principle is that the corroboration required is some independent testimony which affects the prisoner by connecting or tending to connect him with the crime. It need not be direct – it may be circumstantial – as in the present case.
If the confirmation goes to fix the guilt of the person charged, it will be acted on by the Court. Upon review of the facts and bearing in mind that the learned trial Judge had the opportunity of hearing and seeing the witnesses and estimating whether they were speaking the truth as to the material facts, although they may have been incorrect as to some details of their testimony, there is nothing, in my view, in the matters which Mr. Heward-Mills has pointed out as discrepancies, sufficient to quash the conviction.
The appeal is therefore dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
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