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REX
V.
AGNES SAWYER
WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL HOLDEN AT SIERRA LEONE,
13TH DAY OF MARCH, 1937
2PLR/1937/39 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1937/39 (WACA)
(1937) III WACA PP. 155 – 156
LEX (1937) – III WACA PP. 155 – 156
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
DONALD KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA
PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST
WEBBER, C.J., SIERRA LEONE
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BETWEEN:
REX — Respondent
AND
AGNES SAWYER — Appellant
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REPRESENTATION
E. A. C. Davies — for Appellant
S. J. S. Barlatt — for Crown
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Jury trial — Convictions for perjury — Omission by trial Judge to warn jury to acquit if they are left in reasonable doubt — Validity of conviction arising therefrom
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DECISION OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held (Conviction quashed):-
1. It is an essential principle of our criminal law that a criminal charge has to be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; and it is essential that the tribunal of fact should understand this. Where the Judge fails to make sure that the jury appreciate their duty in this respect, the Judge’s omission is as grave an error as active misdirection on the elements of the offence.
2. A verdict of guilty given by a jury who have not taken that fundamental principle into account is deemed equivalent to a case where the essential forms of justice have been disregarded. In such a case, unless it can be predicated that properly directed the jury must have returned the same verdict, a substantial miscarriage of justice appears to be established.
B. R. Lawrence v. The King (1933 Sierra Appeal Cases) followed.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following judgment was delivered: per KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA.
In this case the appellant was charged on three counts with perjury and tried in the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone before B. A. K. McRoberts, Esq., Acting Chief Justice, sitting with a jury. She was convicted on the first two counts and sentenced to three months’ I.H.L. on each, to run concurrently. She now appeals to this Court on the ground inter alia that “the learned trial Judge misdirected the jury in omitting to point out to them that if there was any reasonable doubt, the benefit should be given to the accused.”
The trial Judge in reporting to this Court states that he did not agree with the verdict of the jury because he did not think that the evidence was sufficient to warrant the accused’s conviction, and he summed up in her favour. But although in his summing-up he said in one short sentence, “I want to remind you that it is for the prosecution to fully prove its case,” he failed to point out to the jury that if there was any reasonable doubt the benefit of it should be given to the accused.
The case appears to be exactly covered by the words of Lord Atkin in the case of B. R. Lawrence v. The King, 1993, A.C., P. 699 a p. 707.
“But speaking generally, it has to be remembered that it is an essential principle of our criminal law that a criminal charge has to be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; and it is essential that the tribunal of fact should understand this. Unless the Judge makes sure that the jury appreciate their duty in this respect his omission is as grave an error as active misdirection on the elements of the offence, and a verdict of guilty given by a jury who have not taken this fundamental principle into account is given in a case where the essential forms of justice have been disregarded. In such a case, unless it can be predicated that properly directed the jury must have returned the same verdict, a substantial miscarriage of justice appears to be established.”
In the present case, where the Judge himself considered that the proper verdict was one of acquittal, how can it be predicated that if properly directed the jury must have returned the same verdict of “guilty”? It cannot, and therefore the convictions cannot be upheld.
The appeal is allowed, the convictions are quashed, and it is directed that in each case a judgment and verdict of acquittal be entered.
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