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REX
V.
ANYA UGWUOGO AND OTHERS
THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA
26TH DAY OF APRIL, 1943
2PLR/1943/43 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1943/43 (WACA)
(1943) IX WACA PP. 73 – 75
LEX (1943) – WACA PP. 73 – 75
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA
PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST
GRAHAM PAUL, C.J., SIERRA LEONE
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BETWEEN:
REX – Respondent
AND
1. ANYA UGWUOGO
2. UKA ONU
3. AKANO EBI
4. NWAGU OTU
5. OJI AMA
6. KAMA UGWA – Appellants
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ORIGINAGTING COURT(S)
HIGH COURT OF THE ENUGU-ONITSHA DIVISION BEFORE JEFFREYS, J. SITTING AT UMUAHIA
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REPRESENTATION
S. A. McKinstry — for Crown
No appearance by or for Appellants
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Proof of crime — Statement made by accused person to police officer— “Judges’ Rules” caution administered in native dialect – Where doubt exist whether accused understood a portion of the administered caution – Legal effect
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CASE SUMMARY
The accused were convicted of murder. The trial Judge admitted in evidence statements made by each of the accused when charged. If the statements had been wrongly admitted the remaining evidence would not have been sufficiently strong against the accused. No inducement had been offered, no threat made, and no force used in obtaining the statements, and a caution had been administered following the form prescribed in the “Judges’ Rules”, but the accused may not have understood that portion of the caution as interpreted to them which reads “You are not obliged to by anything in answer to the charge”.
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DECISION(S) OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held:
1. The Court must be satisfied that a statement is entirely free and voluntary. When the Court cannot be certain that the words of the caution were understood, the onus on the Court is all the heavier to be fully satisfied that the statement was really made voluntarily.
2. The trial Court having been satisfied that the statement was voluntarily given at the trial, the statements are deemed properly admitted.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following joint opinion was given:- per KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA, PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST AND GRAHAM PAUL, C.J., SIERRA LEONE.
Six men named respectively, Anya Ugwuogo, Uka Onu, Akano Ebi, Nwagu Otu, Oji Ama and Kama Ugwa, were charged in the High Court of the Enugu-Onitsha Division before Jeffreys, J. sitting at Umuahia with the murder of one Ude Ama. The trial resulted in the conviction of all the accused, subject to the decision of this Court upon the following case which the Learned trial Judge stated in the course of his judgment:-
CASE STATED
“The question to be decided by the West African Court of Appeal is:-
”Was I right in law in admitting the statement of an accused person in answer to the charge in the following circumstances which I find to be proved:-
“(a) No inducement was offered, no threat made or force used in obtaining the statement and the caution administered followed the form prescribed in Rule 5 of ‘The Judges’ Rules’ (See Archbold 29th edition pp. 394, 395) but
“(b) The accused person may not have understood that portion of the caution, all of which was interpreted to him in an African dialect, which reads in English ‘You are not obliged to say anything in answer to the charge’.”
The learned trial Judge admitted evidence of the nature referred to in the case of each of the accused, and as a result convicted each If such evidence were held to have been wrongly admitted the case would not be sufficiently strong against any of the accused and each would be entitled to have his conviction quashed.
The so-called “Judges’ Rules”, which lay down inter alia that persons in custody should not be questioned without the usual caution being first administered, are rules of caution laid down by the Judges in England as the procedure to be followed in that highly civilized country. They should be followed, mutatis mutandis, so far as is possible and practicable in this country.
But it would, in our view, be impossible and impracticable to require, in the case of primitive and unintelligent accused, positive evidence not only that the necessary caution was given but also that it had been understood by them before statements voluntarily made could be admitted as evidence.
In England, if a caution is administered, then the person to whom it is administered is presumed to have understood it until the contrary is shown. In our opinion the same principle applies here.
There is nothing to disturb the presumption in this case and the accused do not aver that they did not understand the caution.
What is essential in cases of this nature is that the Court, before admitting the evidence, should be satisfied that the statement was really made voluntarily and was not prompted by any promise or inducement or threat or by actual violence. When the Court cannot be certain that the words of the caution could be understood or were actually understood, the onus upon the Court is all the heavier to be fully satisfied that the statement was really made voluntarily before admitting it. That, in our view, exactly applies to the present case. The learned trial Judge was fully alive to the difficulty, and finding it impossible to be certain that the words of the caution were understood, gave very special attention to the question of whether or not the statements were really made voluntarily. He came to the conclusion that they were and consequently admitted them. In our opinion he was right to do so. We accordingly answer the question submitted to us in the affirmative.