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REX
V.
JOHNSON OGUMA
WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA
1ST DAY OF NOVEMBER, 1938
2PLR/1938/52 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1938/52 (WACA)
(1938) IV WACA P. 146
LEX (1938) – IV WACA P. 146
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
DONALD KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA
PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST (GHANA)
WEBB, C.J., SIERRA LEONE
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BETWEEN:
REX — Respondent
AND
JOHNSON OGUMA — Appellant
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ORIGINATING COURT(S)
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS BY HIGH COURT
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REPRESENTATION
Appellant in person
C. N. S. Pollard — for Crown
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE – PROOF OF CRIME:- Receiving property to show favour, contrary to section 100 of the Criminal Code – Where particulars given and facts proved do not disclose any offence under section 100 of the Criminal Code – Absence of a transaction pending likely to take place with a person employed in the public service – Legal effect
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DECISION OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held:
It is essential under s. 100 of the Criminal Code that there should be a transaction pending likely to take place with a person employed in the public service. In this case, in place of a person employed in the public service, there was a private prosecutor.
Appeal allowed in respect of one count relating thereto, but in respect of other counts appeal dismissed.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following joint judgment was delivered:
KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA, PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST AND WEBB, C.J., SIERRA LEONE
There is no substance in the appellant’s grounds of appeal, but counsel for the Crown has pointed out that the particulars given and facts proved under the third count do not disclose any offence under section 100 of the Criminal Code. It is essential under that section that there should be a transaction pending likely to take place with a person employed in the public service. In this case, in place of a person employed in the public service, there was a private prosecutor.
We agree with this view and accordingly the appeal is allowed in respect of the third count, the conviction and sentence passed on that count are quashed and it is directed that in respect of that count a judgment and verdict of acquittal be entered.
The appeal in respect of the conviction and sentence on the second count is dismissed, and the appellant will serve the term of twelve months I.H.L. passed upon him in respect of that count.