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REX
V.
JOSEPH WILLIAM
WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA
15TH DAY OF MAY, 1935
2PLR/1935/39 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1935/39 (WACA)
(1935) II WACA P. 389
LEX (1935) – II WACA P. 289
BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS
BUTLER-LLOYD, ACTING C.J., NIGERIA
AITKEN, J.
BARTON, J.
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BETWEEN:
REX – Respondent
AND
JOSEPH WILLIAM – Appellant
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REPRESENTATION
Montacute Thompson — for Appellant
A. R. W. Şayle — for Crown does not support conviction
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Charge against lorry driver for manslaughter of three persons contrary to section 325 of Criminal Code on one count — Acquittal in respect of one charge and conviction in respect of two others — Evidence that driver was trying to avoid a child who ran into the road when he killed the others — How treated
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DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
Held:
1. The accused was charged in one count with the manslaughter of three persons, section 325 of the Criminal Code. The offences were made the subject of a single count. It is a well established rule of law that no one count may charge an accused with having committed two or more separate offences. Therefore, it was not open to the learned Judge to acquit the accused of the manslaughter of the child Victoria and convict him of the manslaughter of the other two persons.
2. The trial Judge accepted the evidence of the defence that it was in trying to avoid the child Victoria who ran suddenly into the road that the accused’s lorry struck the other two persons. Criminal negligence may be defined as negligence of such a nature that it amounts to a reckless disregard for the lives of others. The accused could not be properly held to be guilty of causing the deaths of those other two persons by criminal negligence without evidence that the accused was driving at an excessive speed at the time the child, ran out into the road.
Appeal allowed.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following judgment was delivered:
BARTON, J.
This conviction cannot stand and the learned Acting Solicitor-General who appears for the Crown states that he is unable to support it. The accused was charged in one count with the manslaughter of three persons, section 325 of the Criminal Code. As the offences were made the subject of a single count they must be looked upon as consisting of one single act, for it is a well established rule of law that no one count may charge an accused with having committed two or more separate offences. In view of the above it was not open to the learned Judge to acquit the accused of the manslaughter of the child Victoria and convict him of the manslaughter of the other two persons.
Further, it appears from the record that the learned Judge accepted the evidence of the defence that it was in trying to avoid the child Victoria who ran suddenly into the road that the accused’s lorry struck the other two persons. Criminal negligence may be defined as negligence of such a nature that it amounts to a reckless disregard for the lives of others. The learned Judge having been satisfied that it was in trying to avoid the child Victoria that the accused’s lorry struck the other two persons, we fail to see how the accused could be properly held to be guilty of causing the deaths of those other two persons by criminal negligence nor do we agree that the accused was driving at an excessive speed at the time the child, Victoria, ran out into the road.
For the above reasons the conviction must be quashed.
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