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REX
V.
YAW TEKYI
WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL COURT, HOLDEN AT ACCRA, GOLD COAST
11TH DAY OF JUNE, 1941
2PLR/1941/54 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1941/54 (WACA)
(1941) VII WACA PP. 122
LEX (1941) – VII WACA P. 122
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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
DONALD KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA
PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST
GRAHAM PAUL, C.J., SIERRA LEONE
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BETWEEN:
REX – Respondent
AND
YAW TEKYI – Appellant
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ORIGINATING COURT(S)
APPEAL FROM CONVICTION BY DIVISIONAL COURT
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REPRESENTATION
A. Ridehalgh – for Crown
N. A. Ollennu – for Appellant
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Conviction of Murder – Murder committed on Appellant finding wife in circumstances suggesting recent act of adultery – Defence of provocation – Interpretation of “in the view of” in Section 234(3) of the Criminal Code – How treated
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE ISSUE(S)
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTE:- Section 234(3) of the Criminal Code – Interpretation of “in the view of”
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DECISION(S) OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held (dismissing the Appeal):
1. There is evidence that the appellant killed his wife upon finding her in circumstances which according to his case pointed very strongly to her having just committed adultery.
2. The circumstance in which he found his wife does not afford him the plea of “extreme provocation” envisaged under section 234(3) of the Criminal Code, named that “[a]n act of adultery [was] committed in the view of the accused person with his wife, and so reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following joint judgment was delivered:-
KINGDON, C.J., NIGERIA; PETRIDES, C.J., GOLD COAST; GRAHAM PAUL, C.J., SIERRA LEONE.
The only point which need be dealt with upon this appeal is the interpretation to be put upon section 234(3) of the Criminal Code, the material part of which reads as follows:
”The following matters may amount to extreme provocation to one person to cause the death of another person, namely:
”(3) An act of adultery committed in the view of the accused person with or by his wife or her husband,”
In the present case the appellant killed his wife upon finding her in circumstances which according to his case pointed very strongly to her having just committed adultery. His counsel asks us to hold that such circumstances come within the words “in the view of” in the sub-section quoted and so reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter. We see no reason to give the words “in the view of” any other meaning than their natural and ordinary meaning. If the Legislature had intended something different, it would have been quite easy to say so; and we do not subscribe to counsels submission.
There is no substance in the other grounds of appeal.
The appeal is dismissed.
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