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DANIEL ISAAC UMODU
V.
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL, HOLDEN AT LAGOS, NIGERIA
13TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 1950
2PLR/1950/42 (WACA)
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OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1950/42 (WACA)
(1950) XIII WACA PP. 101-102
LEX (1950) – XIII WACA 101-102
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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
BLACKALL, P.
VERITY, C.J., NIGERIA
LEWEY, J.A.
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BETWEEN
DANIEL ISAAC UMODU – Appellant
AND
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE – Respondent
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ORIGINATING COURT(S)
Appeal from the Supreme Court, W.A.C.A. CR.APP.3299/50.
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REPRESENTATION
J. I. C. Taylor — for Appellant
Stephen, Crown Counsel — for the Respondent
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Consolidation of Criminal Appeals before Supreme Court – Where there is no power to consolidate Criminal Appeals – Effect of illegal consolidation
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CASE SUMMARY
The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court against a conviction of possession of a seditious publication. At the request of Counsel for the appellant the Supreme Court consolidated the appeal with three others of a similar character. On the appeal before this Court Crown Counsel argued that this procedure was irregular, as the law only provides for consolidation of civil cases under the Rules of Court which do not apply to criminal cases.
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DECISION(S) OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held (while declaring the Proceedings in the Supreme Court a nullity) that:
1. The power to consolidate civil actions is derived from Order II, rule 7, of the Rules of Court, but Order I, rule 2, specifically states that the Rules of Court shall apply only to civil cases, except in so far as they may be applied to criminal causes by rules made under any Ordinance. There are no such rules about the consolidation of criminal proceedings.
2. The procedure adopted by the Supreme Court offends against the fundamental principle that an accused person is to be tried upon the evidence adduced in the proceedings against him.
3. The hearing of the appeal in the Supreme Court was a nullity and the parties were therefore in the same position as though that appeal had not been heard.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following Judgment was delivered:
BLACKALL, P.
The appellant in this case appealed to the Supreme Court against a conviction for being in possession of a seditious publication.
At the opening of the appeal in the Court below, Counsel for the appellant asked that the appeal should be consolidated with three other appeals of the same character and that they be heard together. The Crown Counsel did not object and the Court agreed to this course being adopted. But subsequently the Law Officers, having in the meantime considered the matter more fully, came to the conclusion that this procedure was irregular, and the learned Crown Counsel who appeared on this appeal quite properly brought the point before the Court.
Mr. Taylor, for the appellant, was unable to cite any authority to show that criminal appeals may be consolidated, or any statutory provision in that behalf, but he asked that this Court should treat the procedure that was followed as a mere irregularity, we do not think we can. The power to consolidate civil actions derives from a provision in the Rules of Court (Order II, rule 7) which provides that causes or matters pending in the same Court may by order of the Court be consolidated. But Order I, rule 2, specifically stated that the Rules of Court shall apply only to civil causes except in so far as they may be applied to criminal causes by rules made under any Ordinance. There are no such rules about the consolidation of criminal proceedings; nor for that matter, are there any rules for the consolidation of civil appeals before this Court.
It appears to us, therefore, that this is much more than an irregularity, as the procedure adopted offends against the fundamental principle that an accused person is to be tried upon the evidence adduced in the proceedings against him, and that alone. It may, as Mr Taylor suggests, be more convenient for the appellant in this particular case if in some way or other, this Court should adjudicate on the so-called appeal as it stands. But much wider issues are at stake, and we cannot open the door to a procedure which, as I have said, is contrary to a fundamental principle and would be fraught with great danger to accused persons.
In our judgment the hearing of the appeal in the Court below was a nullity. The parties are therefore in the same position as though that appeal had not yet been heard.
Proceedings in Supreme Court declared a nullity.
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