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KWABENA WIAFE AND OTHERS
V.
THE QUEEN
THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL, HOLDEN AT ACCRA, GOLD COAST
9TH DAY OF APRIL, 1953
W.A.C.A NO. 6/53
2PLR/1953/85 (WACA)
OTHER CITATION(S)
2PLR/1953/85 (WACA)
(1953) XIV WACA PP. 308-309
LEX (1953) – XIV WACA 308-309
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BEFORE THEIR LORDSHIPS:
FOSTER-SUTTON, P.
COUSSEY, J.A.
WINDSOR-AUBREY, J.
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BETWEEN:
1. KWABENA WIAFE
2. KWAKU AFFRAM
3. KWAME ADADE – Appellants.
AND
THE QUEEN – Respondent
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ORIGINATING COURT(S)
Appeals by convicted persons against judgment of Benson, J., of the Supreme Court
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REPRESENTATION
N. A. Ollennu — for first Appellant
G. L. A. Djabanor — for second Appellant
H. P. L. Bannerman — for third Appellant
J. N. Glover, Crown Counsel — for the Crown
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ISSUE(S) FROM THE CAUSE(S) OF ACTION
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE:- Nature of corroboration of accomplice not explained — Where no miscarriage of justice — Discrepancies in evidence — Whether verdict unreasonable
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CASE SUMMARY
In spite of a favourable summing up, the jury, after deliberating for nearly an hour, returned a unanimous verdict of guilty of murder. The complaints were that the Judge, though telling the jury that two witnesses must be regarded as accomplices requiring corroboration, did not explain of what sort, and that the conflicts in the evidence made the verdict unreasonable.
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DECISION(S) OF THE WEST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL
Held (dismissing the Appeals) that:
(1) The Judge ought to have explained the nature of the corroboration needed but in fact there was corroborative evidence and the omission had not caused a miscarriage of justice.
(2) The questions at issue were questions of fact for the jury to decide, and they had the advantage of seeing the witnesses: theirs was a considered verdict, which could not be said to be unreasonable.
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MAIN JUDGMENT
The following Judgment was delivered:
FOSTER-SUTTON, P.
In this case the first appellant appealed on questions of law and he and the other two appellants applied for leave to appeal on questions of fact.
The appellants were charged with having, on the 15th October, 1952, murdered one Kwabena Abokyi.
In view of the nature of the case we granted leave to appeal on questions of fact and assigned counsel to each of the appellants to argue the appeals.
The case came for trial before Benson, J., and a jury. After the learned trial Judge had summed up the case to them the jury retired for over fifty minutes to consider their verdict, and then returned a unanimous verdict, against the three appellants, of guilty of murder.
The facts of the case are fully set out in the note of the summing up.
There is no doubt that the deceased man met his death on the night of the 15th October, 1952, as a result of injuries inflicted upon him by some person or persons.
Four eye witnesses gave evidence for the prosecution who, in varying degrees, implicated the three appellants in the commission of the offence.
The learned trial Judge directed the jury that two of the eye witnesses must be regarded as accomplices and that their evidence, therefore, required corroboration, but counsel for first appellant submitted that the trial Judge should have gone further and explained to the jury what sort of corroboration was required, and that his failure to do so amounted to a misdirection fatal to the convictions. It was also submitted by counsel for each appellant that there were so many inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence given by witnesses for the prosecution as to make the verdict unreasonable.
We think that the learned trial Judge ought to have explained to the jury the nature of the corroboration required, but there was in fact corroboration of the evidence of the two witnesses concerned in material particulars, directly connecting the three appellants with the offence charged, and in our view it cannot be said that a miscarriage of justice has occurred by reason of the omission.
The summing up was in fact very favourable to the three accused, and it would appear that the trial Judge leaned to the view that there should be an acquittal, but the questions at issue at the trial were purely questions of fact, and were, therefore, for the determination of the jury. It was for them to say whether or not they were satisfied that the guilt of the accused had been proved by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubt, and to decide accordingly.
The jury had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses and, as I have already said, after a retirement to consider the case lasting some considerable time they returned a unanimous verdict of guilty.
In our view it cannot legitimately be said that the verdict in this case was unreasonable.
The appeals are accordingly dismissed.
Appeals dismissed.
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